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NOTES

U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates
Enforcement of Regulatory Statutes to
Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements: From The Bremen's
License to the Sky Reefer's Edict
ABSTRACT

Through a series of cases culminating with Vimar
Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, the U.S. Supreme
Court has developed a strong pro-arbitationstance regarding
disputes arising out of international commercial contracts.
This Note analyzes the Court's reasonsfor this stance and
compares those reasons with the history and purposes of the
Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention. The
author concludes that the Court's reasons are at odds with
the FAA and the New York Convention. The Note further
articulates the dangersposed to U.S. public policies that are
created by allowing arbitration of statutory claims. The
author argues that the Court has expanded the scope of
arbitrableissues behind that which was intended by the FAA
and the New York Convention and to a point dangerously
close to unraveling U.S. regulatoryschemes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Through a series of cases,' the U.S. Supreme Court has
developed a preference for arbitration of disputes arising out of
international commercial contracts containing an arbitration
clause. The Court's preference began with the assumption that
the United States cannot presume to tell the world that all

1.
Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. 2322
(1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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disputes arising between a U.S. citizen or corporation and
another country's citizen or corporation must be decided by U.S.
courts. 2 The Court recognized the special role forum selection
and choice of law clauses have in obtaining certainty and stability
in international commercial transactions. 3 The Court's focus on
international commercial parties' freedom of contract, however,
has hidden, or at least minimized, the danger that pre-dispute
resolution agreements pose to U.S. public policies as expressed in
U.S. statutory regulations.
The Court articulated reasons for its preference, such as
comity between nations, certainty and stability in the choice of
law between parties to international commercial contracts,
It
quickness in dispute resolution, and freedom of contract.
emphasized the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)4 and
the U.S. ratification of the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(hereinafter "New York Convention")5 when it allowed parties to
6
avoid U.S. regulatory statutes by arbitrating securities,
antitrust,7 and COGSA8 disputes. Indeed, the reasons given by
the Court in this line of cases ignore both the history of
arbitration and its real consequences to U.S. regulatory schemes.
It is important, therefore, to review the reasoning behind the FAA,
as well as the New York Convention, to reveal whether the U.S.
Congress intended to alter the status quo and allow arbitration of
regulatory statutes in addition to contractual and common law
disputes.
This Note analyzes the Court's reasoning behind its proarbitration stance and compares it with the history and purposes
of the FAA and the New York Convention. The Note points out the
false security of recognizing public policy defenses to enforcement
of arbitral awards since the defense, though available, is virtually
never successful. The Note then articulates the dangers posed to
U.S. public policies that arbitration of statutory claims would
create. This Note argues that the Court has expanded the scope of
arbitrable issues beyond that which was intended by the FAA and
the New York Convention and to a point dangerously close to

2.

The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.

3.
4.

Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).

5.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§
201-07 (1994)) [hereinafter New York Convention or Convention].
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
6.
7.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct.
8.
2322 (1995).

62

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 30:59

unraveling U.S. regulatory schemes. Finally, this Note suggests
adopting an amendment to the FAA which declares claims arising
under regulatory statutes inarbitrable and awards rendered on
such claims unenforceable.

II. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to a non-litigation
process that attempts to resolve disagreements to the satisfaction
9
of all parties in an expedient and economically feasible manner.
ADR has become a mainstay in the business community because
"[a] swift resolution of the conflict is more likely to preserve the
relationship among the parties to the dispute, and to reduce the
enormous stress and resentment litigation creates."1 0 There are
many types of ADR, including negotiation, mediation, conciliation,
mini-trials, and other variations. Arbitration,1 1 however, is the
most common method of ADR used to resolve business
12
disputes.
III. HISTORY OF ARBITRATION

A. Common Law

In the Middle Ages, arbitration 13 was used more frequently
than the courts to settle private commercial disputes. 14 The
King's courts in England were not as knowledgeable in mercantile
matters as merchants themselves and thus were not a preferable
forum to hear such matters.' 5 The King's courts eventually
rejected this preference for arbitration, believing that public policy
dictated judicial settlement of disputes and that courts could not
be ousted of their jurisdiction. 16 This view prevailed in statutory

9.
MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ARBITRATION AND
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (1995).

10.
11.

Id.
Arbitration is typically a voluntary process involving a neutral third

party (the arbitrator) who listens to both sides of a dispute and renders a binding
decision. Id. at 7.

12.
13.

Id. at 12.
These extra-judicial fora were termed "merchant courts."

Robert B.

von Mehren, From Vynlor's Case to Mitsubishi The Futureof Arbitration and Public
Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 583, 584 (1986).
14.
Id. at 583-84.

15.

Id. at 584.

16.

Id. at 586.
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form which "envisage[d] arbitration as a process conducted under
the tutelage and with the support of the courts rather than as a
17
largely autonomous alternative to formal judicial proceedings."
Executory agreements to arbitrate, therefore, were held revocable
and non-enforceable, but agreements to arbitrate after the
dispute arose were enforced."8 Arbitration, therefore, developed
in England largely as an alternative process for resolving disputes
under private law and after the dispute arose. 19
B. FederalArbitrationAct 2°
During the Nineteenth Century, the attitude among U.S.
courts toward arbitration agreements resembled England's
common law.
U.S. courts also assumed that pre-dispute
arbitration agreements were revocable and non-enforceable. 2' A
party in breach of the arbitration agreement would be liable in
22
damages but could not be forced to arbitrate the dispute.
Early reformers of arbitration law challenged this revocability
rule as "an anachronism [to] be eliminated as soon as possible."2 3
The reformers initially focused their crusade on the states. Their
success began with the enactment of the modern New York
Arbitration Statute, which allowed specific enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements.2 4 Soon after the passage of the
New York Arbitration statute and other state statutes modeled
thereon, the reformers turned their focus to the federal courts. A
committee of the American Bar Association drafted the United
States Arbitration Act (USAA or FAA), 2 5 modeled on the New York
Arbitration Statute. As did the New York statute, the USAA
provided that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, enforceable

17.

Id. at 587-88.

18.
Id. at 585. Arbitration of a dispute may arise by demand because of a
pre-dispute arbitration clause in a contract, or by submission because of an
agreement between the parties to an existing dispute. JASPER, supra note 9, at 9.
19.
Von Mehren, supra note 13, at 596.
20.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). The FAA applies to arbitration agreements in
any maritime transaction or contracts evidencing a transaction involving

commerce. Id. § 2.
21.
Von Mehren, supra note 13, at 589-90.
22.
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 20 (1992). This refusal to
grant specific performance of the arbitration agreement rested on the theory that
a court could not be ousted of their jurisdiction. Id. at 22.
23.
Id. at 31.
24.
Id. at 48.
25.
The U.S. Arbitration Act is also known as the Federal Arbitration Act.
GARY B. BORN. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 29 (1994).
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existing at law or in
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
26
equity for the revocation of any contract."

In light

of the

conflicting

federal

and

state rules

on

enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the USAA
was proposed to Congress in 1924.27 Before its approval on the
House floor on June 6, 1924, it stated that "[t]he bil provides that
where there are commercial contracts and there is disagreement
under the contract, the court can [eniforce an arbitration
agreement in the same way as other portions of the contract. '' 28
The House Report reiterated this understanding of arbitration
agreements:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the
effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to
his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract
An arbitration
when it becomes disadvantageous to him.
agreement is placed upon the same footing as other contracts,
9
2
where it belongs.
30
The Act passed without opposition in both houses of Congress.
It is clear that the congressional intent in passing the FAA
was merely to reconcile the conflicting federal and state court
policies regarding enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. Since arbitration arose as a method for resolving
contract and common law disputes, strong evidence must be
produced if one is to show that Congress intended to alter the
status quo. However, there is no evidence that suggests Congress
intended to transform arbitration into a mechanism for resolving
statutory disputes.

C. New York Convention
The New York Convention3 l is the product of an international
effort to unify the law regarding recognition and enforcement of

26.
MACNEIL, supranote 22, at 68.
The bill was submitted to Congress in 1923, but It remained In a
27.
Senate Judiciary Committee due to the lateness of the session. The bill was
resubmitted in 1924. Id. at 91.
28.
Id. at 100.
29.
Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in
FederalCourt. Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "ManifestDisregard"of the
Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV. 241, 245 (1993) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)).
30.
Id. The Act was signed into law on February 12, 1925, and became
effective on January 1, 1926. Id.
See New York Convention, supranote 5.
31.
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foreign arbitral awards. 3 2 Although it was adopted in New York
on June 10, 1958, many countries did not become signatories
until years later. 33 This hesitancy has been attributed to the fear
of many nations, including the United States, that many of the
34
New York Convention's provisions conflicted with national law.
The U.S. State Department addressed this fear when it advised
the U.S. Senate 35 of the availability of Article Hf(l) of the New York
Convention which allows a court to refuse enforcement of an
arbitration agreement if it calls for arbitration of a "subject matter
6
[in]capable of settlement by arbitration. ''3
The United States
37
ratified the New York Convention in 1970.

Signatories to the New York Convention must enforce foreign
arbitral awards 38 issued by other member nations unless a
ground for vacatur applies. The grounds for vacating a foreign
arbitral award are found in Article V of the New York Convention,

and includes incapacity of the parties or lack of a valid arbitration
agreement, 39 inadequate notice to or opportunity of a party to

32.
Kristin T. Roy, Note, The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a
Country Use the Public Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic
ArbitralAwards?. 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 920, 929 (1995).

33.
Id. at 925.
34.
Id.
35.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
613, 625 (1985).
36.
See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. II(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2519,
330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
37.
Roy, supra note 32, at 930.
38.
Article I(1) of the New York Convention defines foreign awards to which
it applies as those "made in the territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought." New York Convention,
supra note 5, art. I(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38. Additionally, the
Convention applies to awards rendered in the enforcing state but which are not
considered domestic. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1), 21 U.S.T. at
2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38. The guiding rule is that "an award [will] be considered
[non-domestic if] the relationship involves property located abroad, envisaged
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with
one or more foreign states." Vincent Sama, Problems in Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, Address at the Baker & McKenzie Seminar on Problems in
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Awards, and Interim Orders (November,
1994), In 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 77, 77 (1995).
39.
Article V(1)(a) provides:
The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was
made.
New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 40.
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present a case, 40 an award rendered on a subject beyond the
scope of the arbitration agreement, 4 1 and a defect in the
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral process. 42 In
addition, Article V, Section 2, contains two other grounds for
vacating an arbitral award that may also have reduced the
hesitation many nations felt about ratifying the New York
Convention:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition
and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a)
The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
The recognition or enforcement of 43the award would be
(b)
contrary to the public policy of that country.

Similar to its intention in enacting the FAA, Congress ratified
the New York Convention to ensure enforceability of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. More importantly, by ratifying the New
York Convention, Congress approved uniformity in the law
regarding enforcement of awards. However, Congress equated
uniformity with exclusivity, not with consistency. In other words,
the New York Convention states grounds for vacatur that are
exclusive but which leave their interpretation to the individual
signatories. 4 4 Therefore, as was the case with the FAA, there is

Article V(1)(b) provides, "The party against whom the award is invoked
40.
was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case." New York
Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
Article V(1)(c) provides:
41.
The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that,
if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced.
New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(d), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 42.
Article V(1)(d) provides, "The composition of the arbitral authority or
42.
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place." New York Convention, supra note 5, art,
V(Hc), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
43.
New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
Grounds for vacatur, found in Article V(2)(a) (inarbitrable subject
44.
matter) and V(2)(b) (public policy of the forum) of the Convention, inherently
contain the recognition that different nations have different policies. It is also
implicit in the mandate ofArticle III that no signatory shall "impose[I substantially
more onerous conditions.., on the ... enforcement of arbitral awards to which
this Convention applies than are imposed on the ... enforcement of domestic
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no evidence that Congress intended to change the status quo with
regard to the arbitrability of statutory claims.
D. Conclusion

The history of the FAA, and of arbitration generally, shows
that Congress simply intended that arbitration agreements be
treated the same as other contract provisions. 45 At the time,
arbitration was generally perceived as a vehicle to resolve
disputes concerning contract interpretation or other issues of
private law.46 There is no indication that the reformers or
Congress intended the FAA to transform arbitration into a means
by which businesses escape public regulation by forcing another
party to forego litigation and arbitrate statutory claims. Indeed,
the FAA was passed before the rise of regulatory schemes in the
United States. It was only around the time of the New Deal that
"critics launched a frontal assault against [arbitration] as a
bastion of business power insulated
from social responsibility and
47
contrary to the public interest."
The New York Convention, though ratified by the United
States -well after these concerns were articulated, explicitly
granted member nations the right to refuse to enforce foreign
arbitral awards on the grounds that the subject matter was
incapable of arbitration, or that the award was contrary to the
public policy of the enforcing nation. 4 8
It also required
enforcement of the arbitration agreement if the subject matter
was capable of arbitral resolution. 4 9 These provisions eased the
reservations of a Congress that was concerned about the effect
the New York Convention would have on national laws.
Presumably, Congress was referring to national statutory laws as
opposed to common law. 50 Decisions by the Supreme Court,
however, convey a very different interpretation of congressional
intent in passing the FAA and ratifying the New York Convention.

arbitral awards." New York Convention, supra note 5, art. 11, 21 U.S.T. at 2519,
330 U.N.T.S. at 40. Thus, if domestic awards are difficult to enforce, the New

York Convention does not make foreign awards any less difficult to enforce.
Ramona Martinez, Comment, Recognition and Enforcement of InternationalArbitral
Awards Under the United Nations Convention of 1958: The "Refusal"Provisions, 24
INT'L LAW. 487, 496 (1990).
45.
See discussion supra Parts III.A and III.B.
46.
Von Mehren, supra note 13, at 596.
47.
MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 62.
48.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
49.
See discussion supraPart III.C.
50.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
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U.S. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE FAA AND THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION

The interpretation of congressional intent in passing the FAA
and ratifying the New York Convention has had an interesting
evolution in the Supreme Court. At first, the Court did not
impute to Congress any bias in favor of arbitration of statutory

claims simply because of Congress' enactment of the FAA.
Indeed, the Court did not require an explicit congressional
determination of arbitrability and gave equal consideration to
congressional intent and policies behind the enactment of other
statutes besides the FAA. After ratification of the New York
Convention, however, the Court's attitude changed, at least with
regard to arbitration of statutory claims arising out of
international transactions. It effectively determined that through
the New York Convention, Congress had subordinated
fundamental policy determinations embodied in its statutory law
to broad and vague notions of international comity and the
promotion of international business.
A. Wilko v. Swan
The Court's first opportunity to address whether the FAA
mandated arbitration of statutory claims in the face of an
arbitration clause occurred in Wilko v. Swan.5 1 Although the case
involved domestic rather than international arbitration, the
Court's concerns over arbitration of statutory claims are just as
applicable in an international context.
Petitioner, a customer,
brought an action against
respondents, partners in a securities brokerage firm, under
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.52 Respondents moved
to stay the litigation pending arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause contained in the margin agreements governing
the parties' relationship. 5 3 The district court denied the motion.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.54

The Supreme

Court reversed the appellate court, holding that a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement is void under Section 14 of the Securities
Act of 1933.55

51.
346 U.S. 427 (1953) overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
52.
Id. at 428.
53.
Id. at 429.
54.
Id. at 430.
55.
Id. at 438. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that
"'[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules
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The Court specifically noted the conflicting policies behind
the Securities Act of 1933 and the FAA. The Securities Act was
designed to protect investors through a system of full and fair
disclosure along with the special private right of action devised to
effectuate that policy. On the other hand, the FAA was designed
to establish the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation.5 6 The Court, however, emphasized the weaknesses of
arbitration of statutory claims:
situations where "arbitrators'
conception[s] of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements
as 'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact"' cannot be
scrutinized by the courts since awards may be made without
reasoned opinions, and the power to vacate an award is limited
under the FAA. 57
Under these circumstances, and with the
language of Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 in mind, the
Court determined that the policy behind the Securities Act should
58
trump the FAA.
Although Wilko was overruled by Rodriguez de Qujas v.
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc.,59 it is still frequently cited, and
invoked, for one line of its dicta: When discussing its concern
about the non-reviewability of arbitral awards, the Court rather
whimsically declared that "interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrastto man!fest disregardare not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation. ' 60 The
Manifest Disregard Doctrine is one of the most frequently invoked
defenses to confirmations of arbitral awards, and will be
61
discussed below.

and regulations of the Commission shall be void'." Id. at 430 n.6 (quoting 48 Stat.
84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77n). The Court determined that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are a "stipulation" and that "the right to select the judicial forum is
the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived." Id. at 434-35.
56.
Id. at 431.
57.
Id. at 436 (citation omitted). The Court pointed out that:

Determination of the quality of a commodity or the amount of money due
under a contract is not the type of issue here involved. This case requires
subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator of
the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators

without judicial instruction on the law.
Id. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted).
58.
Id. at 438.
59.
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
60.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
61.
See Infra Part V.B. 1.
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B. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
The Wilko Court's neutral attitude toward arbitration soon
changed. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,6 2 the Court
became more lenient toward forum selection clauses. 63 It was in
this case that the Court first articulated the undesirability of
forcing U.S. laws and courts on the international business
community.
The parties, a U.S. corporation and a German corporation,
entered into an international towage contract that contained a
forum selection clause providing for litigation in England. 6 4 The
barge was damaged during the tow and Zapata brought suit in
The defendant-corporation invoked the
the United States. 65
forum selection clause and moved to stay the litigation pending
determination by the High Court of London. 6 6 The district court
denied the motion and granted Zapata's motion to restrain the
defendant from litigating in England. 6 7 The Fifth Circuit Court 6of
9
Appeals affrmed. 68 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded.
The Court held that a forum selection clause "should control
absent a strong showing that it should be set aside."70 The Court
looked at the interests of the immediate parties involved and
noted that:
IM]uch uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both
parties could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction
in which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any
place [where personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established].
The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on
a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in
71
international trade, commerce, and contracting.

Therefore, the party seeking to avoid enforcement must show that
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust. 72 The Court

62.
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
In a later case, the Court characterized an arbitration agreement as a
63.
.specialized kind of forum-selection clause." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
64.
The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2.
65.
Id. at3.
66.
Id. at 4.
67.
Id. at 6.

68.

Id. at 7.

69.

Id. at 20. Because the district court and appellate court engaged in a

forum non conveniens analysis, the Supreme Court remanded for a determination
under its newly articulated test of whether enforcement of the forum selection
The burden to show
clause would have been unreasonable and unjust.

unreasonableness is on the party seeking to avoid enforcement. Id. at 15.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 13-14.
72.
Id. at 10.
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held that this burden could not be satisfied by showing that 73a
foreign court would apply a law directly contrary to U.S. law,
explaining that "[tihe expansion of American business and
industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn

contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts."74 It emphasized
characterized the "ouster" argument as a
freedom of contract and
75
"vestigial legal fiction.
In holding as it did, the Court ignored the interests of the
U.S. government and the public. These interests first, and most
importantly, require U.S. regulatory statutes to be applied to
disputes involving a regulated party and, second, require these
statutes to be interpreted and applied by a U.S. court accountable
to the U.S. public. This Supreme Court trend toward focusing on
business interests such as convenience and predictability, while
completely ignoring U.S. governmental and public interests,
method of legal reasoning in
developed into an 7uncompromising
6
subsequent cases.
C. Scherk v. Alberto-CulverCo.
The Bremen dealt with forum-selection clauses choosing the
courts of a particular country. However, the consideration of
international business interests was extended to determinations
of the validity of arbitration clauses in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
CO. 77 The Court in this case chose to treat these interests, not

the FAA-New York Convention, as the controlling factors in such
determinations.
Plaintiff Alberto-Culver, a U.S. corporation, entered into a
contract with defendant Scherk, a German citizen, to purchase
The contracts
several business entities owned by Scherk. 78
contained an arbitration clause requiring arbitration in Paris.
Plaintiff discovered that the defendant had misrepresented the

The contract at Issue in The Bremen contained an exculpatory clause
73.
which would have been enforceable in England, but not in the United States. Id.
at 2. 7.
Id. at 9. A party cannot meet this burden by claiming the forum is
74.
inconvenient when that inconvenience was clearly foreseeable at the time of
contracting. Id. at 17-18. Indeed, to show that enforcement would be unfair,
unjust, or unreasonable, a party must show that trial in the forum would be so
"gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be
deprived of his day in court." Id. at 18.
Id. at 12.
75.
See discussion infra Parts IV.C, IV.D, and V.E.
76.
77.
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
78.
Id. at 508. The purchased entities were organized under the laws of
Germany and Liechtenstein. Id.
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fact that several trademarks were encumbered, and brought suit
claiming a violation of Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. 7 9 The district
court, relying on the Court's decision in Wilko, denied defendant's
motion to stay litigation and compel arbitration. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 80
The Supreme Court
reversed.81
The majority focused extensively on the "truly international"
character of the contract between Scherk and Alberto-Culver
when it held Wilko inapposite to the case at bar. 8 2 It stressed the
resulting uncertainty as to which country's law would be applied
to the contract, as opposed to the unquestionable conclusion in
Wilko that U.S. securities laws would apply. 8 3 This uncertainty,
in the majority's view, was of sufficient importance to justify an
arbitration and choice of law clause as "an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction." 84 The Court
further found that a refusal to enforce such clauses "would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to
secure
tactical
litigation advantages," 85
a result left
undistinguished from purely domestic litigation and therefore
seemingly acceptable to the Court in that context. The public
policy interests embodied in the Securities Exchange Act of
193486 took a back seat to these parties' private interests, a result
clearly at odds with the intent of regulatory statutes that
subordinate private interests to public interests. The Court

79.
80.

Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.

81.

Id. at 520-21.

82.

Id. at 515. The Court noted:

The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract in Austria and to
the closing in Switzerland took place in the United States, England, and
Germany, and involved consultations with legal and trademark experts
from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein. Finally, and most
significantly, the subject matter of the contract concerned the sale of
business enterprises organized under the laws of and primarily situated in
European countries, whose activities were largely, if not entirely, directed
to European markets.
Id.
83.
Id. at 515-16.
84.
Id. at 516.
85.
Id. at 516-17.
86.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to protect investors
from issuers of securities through the imposition of a scheme of systematic
disclosure requirements. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder
are the main anti-fraud provisions under the Act. Id. at 522-23 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).

1997]

U.S. ARBITRATION OFREGULATORY STATUTES

pointed out that courts, when sitting to determine the validity of
an arbitral award, are able to refuse enforcement on public policy
grounds. 87 The Court expressed no opinion as to whether the
New York Convention, apart from the considerations expressed in
would require enforcement of the arbitration
the opinion,
88
agreement.
D. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc.
The Scherk Court relied on international business interests
when it allowed the arbitration of securities claims. It found the

U.S. ratification of the New York Convention supported its
conclusion, but it did not find the New York Convention
controlling. In allowing arbitration of antitrust claims that arise
in international transactions, the Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Sales Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 89 also emphasized the business
interests and comity factors, but with greater focus on the FAA
and the New York Convention. As in Scherk, the Court justified
its judgment by relying upon an award-enforcement stage to
provide a chance for a court to ensure the arbitrator applied U.S.
statutory law.
Plaintiff Mitsubishi, a Japanese corporation, entered into a
distributorship and sales agreement with defendant Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, a Puerto Rican corporation, which contained
90
an arbitration clause providing for arbitration in Japan.
Disputes arose under the contract culminating in an action
brought by Mitsubishi pursuant to the FAA and the New York

87.

Although the question is undecided:

[Plresumably the type of fraud alleged here could be raised, under Art. V of
the [New York Convention] in challenging the enforcement of whatever
arbitral award is produced through arbitration. Article V(2)(b) of the [New
York] Convention provides that a country may refuse recognition and
enforcement of an award if 'recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country'.
Id. at 519 n.14.
88.

Without reaching the issue of whether the [New York] Convention,

apart from the considerations expressed in this opinion, would require of
its own force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present
case . . . this country's adoption and ratification of the [New York]
Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration
Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent

with the decision [reached].
Id. at 520 n.15.
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
89.
Id. at 616-17.
90.
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Convention to compel arbitration.9 Soler counterclaimed alleging
antitrust violations by Mitsubishi. 9 2 The district court ordered
arbitration. 9 3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed the district court's order to arbitrate the antitrust
claims.9 4 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
ordered arbitration of the antitrust claims. 9 5
The Court first stated that nothing in the FAA raised a
presumption against the arbitration of statutory claims. 9 6 To the
contrary, the Court found it significant that the congressional
intent behind the FAA was to enforce these private arbitration
agreements. 9 7 It stated that a party does not surrender his or her
statutory rights by agreeing to arbitrate, but only submits their
resolution to a different forum-an arbitration panel. 9 8 The Court
did not pass upon the question regarding arbitrability of antitrust
disputes arising from domestic transactions. But in invoking the
"[i]dentical considerations govern[ing] the Court's decision" in
Scherk9 9 and The Bremen, the Court concluded that:
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of
the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties'
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context. 100

91.
Id. at 618.
92.
Id. at 619-20.
93.
Id. at 620. Relying on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974), the district court held that the international nature of the case required
enforcement of the arbitration agreement even though antitrust claims
presumably would not be arbitrable if arising from a purely domestic
undertaking. Id. at 621.
94.
Id. at 623. The Court of Appeals did, however, affirm the order to
arbitrate all other disputes arising under the contract. Id. at 621.
95.
Id. at 640.
96.
Id. at 625. The Court also stated that Article II(1) of the New York
Convention (requiring recognition of agreements to arbitrate which involve a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration) "contemplates exceptions to
arbitrability grounded in domestic law," as opposed to internationally recognized

principles. Id. at 639 n.21. Athough recognizing that the U.S. State Department
had advised the Senate of this option before accession to the New York
Convention, the Court dismissed these facts, stating "[ylet in implementing the
Convention by amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress did not
specify any matters it intended to exclude from its scope." Id. Therefore, the
Court "decline[d] to subvert the spirit of the United States accession to the
Convention by recognizing subject-matter exceptions where Congress has not
expressly directed the courts to do so." Id. at 639-40 n.21.
97.
I& at 625.
98.
Id. at 628.
99.
Id. at 630.
100. Id. at 629.
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The Court found that these comity concerns were buttressed by
the "emphatic federal policy" favoring arbitration, especially in the
field of international commerce since the U.S. accession to the
10
New York Convention. '
The Court dismissed the danger of a business bias in the
arbitration panel by concluding that "[i]nternational arbitrators
frequently are drawn from the legal as well as the business
commurnity.' ' I0 2 The Court then stated that while the private
damages remedy provided for in the antitrust statutes has a
central role in enforcing the statutory regime, arbitration is just
as appropriate a forum for that enforcement as a judicial forum.
Although the Court recognized that an "international arbitral
tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the legal norms of particular
states" and "has no direct obligation to vindicate their statutory
dictates," arbitrators are bound to carry out the parties' intent
when that intent includes application of U.S. statutory law.' 0 3 In
a footnote, the Court noted that if the agreement's choice of forum
of the
and choice of law clauses functioned as prospective waivers
04
statutory claims, it would be void as against public policy.1
Finally, the Court justified its decision by stating that the
New York Convention allows the award to be reviewed at the
award-enforcement stage to ensure that "enforcement of the
antitrust laws has been addressed."' 0 5 Immediately after this
statement, however, the Court conceded that substantive review
should remain minimal at the award-enforcement stage and
cognizance of the antitrust
limited to ensuring that the panel1 took
6
claims and in fact decided them.'
E. Vimar Seguros YReaseguros v. MIV Sky Reefer
The Mitsubishi Court reaffirmed the great significance the
Court attaches to international business interests and comity
concerns, but placed that significance in the-context of the FAA
and the New York Convention. It determined that those interests
do not outweigh the interests in having U.S. antitrust laws apply
to the arbitration. However, in the absence of a congressional
determination that certain statutory claims are inarbitrable, the

101. Id. at 631.
102. Id. at 634.
103. Id. at 636. Although the sales agreement included a choice of law
clause providing for the application of Swiss law, Mitsubishi conceded that U.S.
law applied to the antitrust claims and that these claims had been submitted as
such to the Japanese arbitral tribunal. Id. at 637 n. 19.
104. Id. at 637 n.19.
105. Id. at 638.
106. Id.
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award-enforcement stage, not the agreement-enforcement stage,
is the appropriate time to ensure that U.S. statutes were applied.
07
The Court in Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. MIV Sky Reefer'

took this analysis one step further, concluding that a court
should do everything possible to avoid interpreting a U.S. statute
as declaring a claim arising under it inarbitrable.
A New York partnership (Bacchus) contracted with a
Moroccan fruit supplier (Galaxie) to purchase a shipload of fruit.
The form bill of lading contained a choice of law and arbitration
clause.10 8
Upon discovering the fruit was damaged during
shipment, Bacchus brought suit under the bill of lading. Galaxie

requested that the district court stay proceedings and compel
arbitration in Tokyo. Bacchus argued that the arbitration clause
was unenforceable under the FAA because it was a contract of
adhesion and also violated section 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA).' 0 9 The district court granted the motion to stay
and to compel arbitration. 1 10 On interlocutory appeal, the First
Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed."'
The Supreme Court
2
affirmed."
The Court declined to resolve any conflict between COGSA
and the FAA, noting that the two statutes can be interpreted to

107.

115 S.Ct. 2322 (1995).

108. Id. at 2325. Clause 3 of the form bill of lading was entitled "Governing
Law and Arbitration," and provided:
(1) The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lading shall be
governed by the Japanese law.
(2) Any dispute arising from this Bill of Lading shall be referred to
arbitration in Tokyo by the Tokyo Maritime Arbitration Commission
(TOMAC) of The Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc., in accordance with the
rules of TOMAC and any amendment thereto, and the award given by the
arbitrators shall be final and binding on both parties.
Id.
109. Id. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 3(8), 46 U.S.C. § 1303 provides:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier
or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods,
arising from negligence, fault, or failure In the duties or obligations provided in
this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter,
shall be null and void and of no effect.
Id. at 2326-27.
110. Id.at2325.
111. Id. at 2326. The First Circuit assumed that forum selection clauses
were invalid under COGSA § 3(8) and then determined that the FAA preempts
this invalidation since the FAA was enacted later in time and specifically allows
for enforcement of arbitration agreements in bills of lading. Id.
112. Id.
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exist harmoniously. The Court held section 3(8) of COGSA does
113
not forbid foreign forum selection clauses.
The Court rejected Bacchus' first argument that a foreign
arbitration clause lessens liability under section 3(8) of COGSA by
increasing the transaction costs of obtaining relief. 11 4 The Court
stated that the language of section 3(8) does not support Bacchus'
conclusion since:
The statute . . . addresses the lessening of the specific liability
imposed by the Act, without addressing the separate question of
the means and costs of enforcing that liability. The difference is

that between explicit statutory guarantees and the procedure for
enforcing them, between applicable liability principles and the
forum in which they are to be vindicated.

1 15

In other words, section 3(8) of COGSA contains specific
substantive obligations and procedures that a carrier may not
limit or alter in a bill of lading; it does not, however, specify a
particular forum in which those obligations must be enforced.
Further, the Court noted that of the sixty-six countries that
have signed onto the Brussels Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading (hereinafter "Hague
Rules"), on which COGSA is modeled; the only countries that do
not allow foreign forum selection clauses have specific provisions
against these clauses in their domestic versions of the Hague
Rules. 1 1 Because the Hague Rules were designed "to establish
uniform ocean bills of lading to govern the rights and liabilities of
carriers and shippers inter se in international trade," the Court
felt it should be consistent with the other signatories in the Rules'
Additionally, the Court cited its familiar
interpretation.' 17
reasons for upholding forum selection clauses in international
agreements: promotion of international comity, expansion of U.S.
and predictability of international
business into the world market,
8
business transactions.'1
Finally, as additional support for construing COGSA as
allowing choice of forum clauses in bills of lading, the Court cited
the FAA's policy of enforcing arbitration agreements where there
is no independent basis in law or equity for revocation. 1 19 The

113. Id. at 2325. The Court did not pass upon the validity of the choice of
law clause since the arbitrator decides that question in the first instance. Id.at
2330.
114. Id. at 2326.
115.
Id.at 2327.
116.
Id. at 2328.

117.

Id. (quoting Robert C. Herd Co. v. Krawall Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297,

301 (1959)).
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 2329.
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Court warned that interpreting domestic legislation in a manner
that would violate an international agreement
could compromise
20
the U.S. role in multilateral endeavors.'
The Court also rejected Bucchus' second argument that there
is a risk that foreign arbitrators would not apply COGSA12 1 or
would interpret COGSA differently than would a U.S. court.
Bucchus argued that the Japanese Hague Rules allow the carrier
a defense based on the acts or omissions of the stevedores hired
by the shipper. COGSA, however, makes the carrier's obligations
nondelegable. 12 2 The Court stated that it is still unresolved as to
whether the carrier's duty safely to load and stow cargo is
nondelegable under COGSA, and in any event, it was unclear at
this interlocutory stage what law the arbitrator would utilize. The
claim that the carrier's liability would be lessened due to the
substantive law applied in arbitration was premature since it
depended upon what law the arbitrator would choose 123 and
whether the 24 duties under COGSA are delegable or
nondelegable.1

The Court stressed the importance of two factors in making
its decision: (1) the district court retained jurisdiction over the
case and would have the opportunity for subsequent review at the
award-enforcement stage; and (2) the Court was not persuaded
that the forum and law selection clauses operated prospectively to
waive the right to pursue statutory remedies. 125 In the absence of
these two factors, the Court stated12 it
would not hesitate to void
6
the clause as against public policy.
F. Conclusion
As evidenced by this line of cases, the Supreme Court has
viewed the FAA as a congressional determination that private
parties in international commercial transactions should be
120.

Id.

121. The clause in the bill of lading stated that Japanese law was to govern
any dispute. See supra note 108.
122. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. 2322,
2329 (1995).
123. The arbitrator decides the choice-of-law question in the first instance.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n. 19
(1985).
124. Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. at 2329. If the duties under COGSA are

delegable, then the Japanese Hague Rules are consistent with COGSA and
liability would not be lessened. If. however, the duties under COGSA are
nondelegable, then the Japanese law would contradict COGSA and would lessen
liability. As the Court noted, it was premature to decide whether liability would
be lessened substantively at an interlocutory stage. Id.
125. Id. at 2330.
126. Id.
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allowed to arbitrate almost any statutory claim.
The Court
ignored the fact that the history of arbitration, which formed the
backdrop of Congress' passage of the FAA, included arbitration of
127
It
only common law claims and contract interpretation.

ignored the reasons behind promotion of a federal arbitration
law 1 2 8 and imputed to Congress an intent to promote
arbitration. 129
Even if Congress had the intent to promote
arbitration as arbitration then existed, 130 it is a far leap for the
Court to believe Congress intended to promote arbitration of
statutory claims at a time when such claims were not customarily
arbitrated and before the rise of statutory regulation in the United
States. 131
The cases also show that the Court interpreted the New York
Convention as a congressional subordination of statutory policy
determinations to the broad and vague notions of international
comity and the promotion of international business. Disregarding
the hesitation of the United States to accede to the Convention
and the subsequent reliance that Congress eventually placed
upon the language of Article If(l) (requiring recognition of
agreements to arbitrate involving a "subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration"), the Court rendered that language a
virtual nullity by noting that Congress did not except statutory
claims when it amended the FAA to implement the New York
Convention.' 3 2 Of course, Congress could disallow arbitration of
claims arising under a statute by explicit statement in its
statutes. The Court did not, however, consider the practicality of
amending every statute to this effect. 133 Solely because of the act
of acceding to an arbitration convention, the Court assumed a
widespread congressional policy of promoting international
business, which mandates that the interests of the business
world be given priority.

127.

See supra Part III.

128.

See supra Part III.B.

129. By giving effect to the parties' agreement to arbitrate, Congress
certainly was not condemning arbitration, but this does not mean that it enacted
the FAA to promote arbitration.
130. Arbitration was a method of resolving common law claims and issues
of contract interpretation. See discussion supra Part Ill.
131.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
132.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
133.
Congress certainly could amend the FAA to list those statutory claims
it deems inarbitrable, and perhaps this is the only way to overturn the Supreme
Court's determinations.
However, at the time it acceded to the New York
Convention, Congress believed Article II(1) would allow a country, to declare
inarbitrable claims arising under its regulatory schemes to be without the
formality of enumerating inarbitrable subject matter. See, e.g., supra note 96.
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Finally, as if the Court itself felt uncomfortable with foreign
arbitrators interpreting and deciding issues affecting U.S.
statutes, it consistently made reference to the award-enforcement
stage wherein a court could ensure that the law had been applied.
The Court acknowledged that investigation of arbitral awards
should be minimal and assumed that a court could readily
ascertain whether the arbitrator took cognizance of and applied
the applicable statute.
The Court did not address the
methodology for determining whether an arbitrator interpreted
and applied U.S. statutes in the same way as a U.S. court would
have interpreted and applied them. This concern is discussed
134
below in more detail.
Of particular interest is the evolution of the Supreme Court's
attitude toward arbitration of statutory claims. In Wilko, the
Court took a neutral attitude and balanced the policy interests
that underly the FAA and the securities laws. It did not find the
FAA's "pro-arbitration" policy controlling even though Congress
had not excepted the Securities Act of 1933 from the FAA. In The
135
Bremen, however, the Court's neutral attitude began to change.
The Court began focusing on international business interests
such as convenience and predictability, as well as the notion of
"comity." When the Court decided Scherk, its approach firmly
emphasized the factors of international business interests and
comity. Curiously, however, these two factors were the deciding
influence for the Courts decision, rather than the principles of the
FAA or the New York Convention. 13 6 The Mitsubishi Court placed
much more emphasis on the FAA and the New York Convention
than it previously had done before.
It focused again on
international concerns, but in doing so, relied more on the FAA

than in the prior cases.

It determined that the award-

enforcement stage is an appropriate time for a court to ensure
that U.S. statutes were applied. By the time the Court decided
Sky Reefer, its interpretation of the New York Convention and the
FAA as mandating arbitration of statutory claims in the face of an
arbitration clause had hardened. Again, the Court mechanically
articulated the familiar international interests. More notably,
however, the Court radically reasoned that these interests, the
FAA, and the New York Convention required a court to do
everything possible to avoid a finding that a statute was intended
to make a claim arising under it inarbitrable. After Sky Reefer, It

134. See infra Part V.
135. Although The Bremen dealt with a choice of forum as opposed to an
arbitration clause, the Court in Scherk characterized arbitration clauses as a type
of forum-selection clause. See supra note 63.
136. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
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is clear that the Court will permit arbitration of statutory claims
that arise in international transactions in the absence of a clear
congressional direction to the contrary. However, it is not obvious
what may constitute a sufficiently "clear Congressional
13 7
direction."

V.

DANGERS TO U.S. REGULATORY SCHEMES POSED BY THE SUPREME
COURT'S PRO-ARBITRATION STANCE

The Court did not state in any of the above cases that parties
may opt out of U.S. regulatory statutes. 13 8 However, as long as
the Court allows arbitration of statutory claims under the current
system of arbitration, pre-dispute arbitration agreements can
effectively prevent application of regulatory statutes. Therefore,
the public policies embodied in these statutes are threatened by
their relegation to arbitral tribunals.
This relegation is not
justified by either the FAA or the New York Convention, 139 nor is
it justified by international business concerns or comity. 140 The
Court has encroached upon congressional territory by engaging in
judicial legislation and policy-making, thus potentially unravelling

U.S. regulatory schemes and undermining congressional policies.
A. The Current Structure of ArbitrationPrevents Courtsfrom
Reviewing ArbitralAwards

Because

of

several

arguable

advantages, 14 1

contracts

14 2
involving international trade often contain arbitration clauses.

137. One can imagine a statute stating, "All claims arising under this Act
are inarbitrable." In an effort to interpret the Act as allowing arbitration, one can
also imagine a court deeming the language applicable only to primary claims, but
allowing arbitration If the claim is secondary in nature (such as a counterclaim or
a defense). Based on the Sky Reefer Court's language that interpreting domestic
legislation to conflict with an international obligation would compromise U.S.
efforts in multilateral endeavors, one can also imagine a court deeming the
language applicable only to domestic arbitrations, thus allowing the claims to be
arbitrated if they arise in an international transaction.
138. Indeed, the Court stated that statutory rights before a dispute arises
would violate public policy for a party to waive. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985); Vemar Segurus Y
Reasegaras, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. 2322, 2330 (1995).
139. See discussion supra Part III.
140. See discussion Infra Part V.C.2.
141. Whether the advantages to arbitration are in fact real is beyond the
scope of this Note. However, many of the "advantages" have been criticized.
"[International arbitration is also not infrequently criticized as both slow and
expensive," even by its proponents. BORN.supra note 25, at 8. "[T]he choice of
law complexities which arise in international arbitration do not comport with the
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Through these clauses, the parties create their own arbitration
system.14 3
In international business transactions, parties
typically provide in the pre-dispute arbitration clauses that the
arbitration should be governed by the rules of a particular arbitral
institution. 1 44 The main dilemma created by arbitral institutions'
rules is that they result in a system of secrecy that cloaks the
arbitration with impunity from judicial review.
Because the rules of arbitral institutions are designed, to
further expediency and finality, the basic attributes of arbitration
formalities are minimal. 1 4 5 Written transcripts of the proceedings
are not required 1 46 and parties rarely request them.14 7
In
addition, when the parties cannot agree, the arbitrator decides
what law will be applicable to the substance of a dispute under
148
any conflict of laws rules he or she deems appropriate.
Further, arbitrators are not required to explain the reasons for
their decisions. 149 Therefore, American Arbitration Association
(AAA) awards generally consist only of a brief charge to the parties

on a single sheet of paper.'

50

The parties may request a reasoned

ideals of predictability, informality, and efficiency that arbitration promises." Id.
at 100.
Some frequently articulated advantages of arbitration include simplicity,
privacy, informality, finality, quickness, economic feasibility, and experienced,
expert arbitrators. Galbraith, supra note 29, at 244.
142. JASPER, supra note 9, at 13.
143.
ROBERT COULSON, BusI riEss ARBITRATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 8
(3d ed. 1987).
144.
JASPER, supra note 9, at 13; BORN, supra note 25, at 4. The three
prominent associations are the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the Court
of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris (ICC), and the
London Court of Arbitration. COULSON, supra note 143, at 122, 132. The ICC is
the world's leading international arbitral institution. BORN, supra note 141, at 5
n.20.
145.
See COULSON, supra note 143, at 26 ("In general, the AAA encourages
parties to streamline their procedures.").
146.
See, e.g., JASPER, supranote 9, at 72 app. § 23.
147.
See COULSON, supra note 143, at 26 ("In arbitration, transcripts are
often a waste of money. In most cases, the arbitrator and the attorneys rely upon
their own notes.").
148.
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 280 (1984)
(citing the Revised Rules of Arbitration of the ICC).
149.
COULSON, supra note 143, at 29. Neither the ICC nor the AAA
arbitration rules require written reasoned opinions. However, the AAA has
developed a set of international arbitration rules in response to the growing
number of international commercial arbitrations. AAA Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Convention reprinted In BORN, supra note
25, at 941-51 app. I. Article 28(2) of those rules requires the arbitrators to state
the reasons for their award unless the parties agree otherwise. Id. at 948.
However, Article 1(1) of those rules states that the parties must affirmatively state
in writing that "these International Arbitration Rules" will govern the arbitration, a
requirement many parties overlook. Id. at 941.
150. COULSON, supra note 141, at 29.
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opinion, but the AAA, as a general matter, does not encourage
them.1 5 1 Finally, an arbitrator should have no further connection
with the case once the award is signed, which includes not
15 2
becoming involved in any subsequent court action.
As a result of these informalities, a court asked to vacate an
award has no evidence to help determine whether the arbitrator
applied the correct law or made reversible errors. This means
that the arbitrator can choose to apply some law other than U.S.
law. I1 3 Without a transcript or reasoned opinion, a court will
never know what law the arbitrator chose to apply to the dispute.

Because arbitration awards are presumed valid and will not be

reviewed for errors or misinterpretations in the law, 154 the court
55

is then left with no choice but to enforce the award.
In sum, because the rules of arbitral institutions currently

are designed to expedite dispute resolution between the parties
and promote fmality, they do not result in awards that are
conducive to judicial scrutiny at the award-enforcement stage.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's reliance on the award-

151.
Id. The AAA does not encourage written, reasoned awards because
they provide bases for a losing party to attack, thus threatening finality of the
award. Id. A written award, in other words, would undercut one of the
advantages of arbitration-finality-and open up a winning party to various
attacks on the merits, thus transforming arbitration into the first step of litigation.
Marta B. Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard, 49 Disp. RESOL.
J. 64, 68 (1994); see also Bret F. Randall, The History, Application, and Policy of
the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L.
REv. 759, 759 ("For a court to review the merits would reduce arbitration from an
efficient, private means of resolving disputes to a mere pre-litigation formality.").
152.
COULSON, supra note 143, at 29.
153.
If the arbitrator were only choosing which law to use in guiding his
contract interpretation or in determining validity and elements of non-statutory
claims, this would be unobjectionable. This, however, is not always the case. See
supra Part III.
154. A court will review the award for manifest disregard, as opposed to
misapplication of the law, but it is impossible to determine if an arbitrator acted
in manifest disregard of the law without a reasoned opinion. See Infra Part V.B. 1.
155. Varela, supra note 151, at 68. As an illustration, imagine a dispute
arising under a contract containing an arbitration clause, but no choice of law

clause. X claims breach of contract, and Y counterclaims with an alleged U.S.
antitrust law violation which would invalidate the contract.
The arbitrator
chooses to not apply U.S. law and decides for X on the breach of contract claim.
The award states, "Judgment in favor of X against Y in the amount of
$2,000,000." X takes the award to a U.S. court for enforcement, and Y requests
the court to vacate the award since the arbitrator did not apply U.S. antitrust law.
The court, not able to discern from the face of the award whether the arbitrator in
fact disregarded U.S. law, would enforce the award since it is wholly conceivable
that the arbitrator did apply the U.S. antitrust law and found Ys counterclaim
meritless. The court could not ask the arbitrator what law was applied because
once the arbitrator has signed the award he has no further connection with the
case.
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enforcement stage to ensure application of U.S. statutes is
56
unrealistic. 1
B. ArbitralAwards are Rarely Vacated
Instead of declaring certain statutory claims to be
inarbitrable at the agreement-enforcement stage, the Court has

relied upon the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the
statute was applied. 157 The FAA lists four grounds for vacating
an arbitral award, 15 8 and the New York Convention lists seven
grounds. 15 9 Of these eleven grounds for vacatur of an arbitral

156. As Justice Stevens noted, "[tihe rudimentary procedures which make
arbitration so desirable in the context of a private dispute often mean that the
record is so inadequate that the arbitrator's decision Is virtually unrevewable."
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 656-67
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157.
See supra Parts IV.C, IV.D, and IV.E.
158.
Section 10 of the FAA provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court In and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration(1)
Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so Imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).

159.

Article V of the Convention provides:

1.
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party against whom it Is invoked, only If that party furnishes
to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement Is
sought, proof that:
(a)
The parties to the agreement referred to in article II
were, under the law applicable to them, under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected It or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
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award,' 60 only three 16 1 could allow the enforcing court to vacate
16 2
an arbitral award because U.S. statutory law was not applied.
However, because of the current structure of arbitration, none of
these three grounds have proven workable options for a court to
163
vacate an award.

(b)
The party against whom the award is invoked was
not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c)
The award deals with a difference not contemplated
by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d)
The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was
not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
(e)
The award has not yet become binding on the
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.
2.
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that:
(a)
The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b)
The recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.
New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V. 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40,
42.
160.
The FAA grounds for vacatur may only be invoked when the award was
made in the United States since section 10 states that only the "United States
court in and for the district wherein the award was made can make an order
vacating the award." 9 U.S.C. § 10. The New York Convention applies to awards
rendered outside the United States, as well as awards rendered within the United
States that are considered non-domestic. See supra note 38.
161.
These three grounds are found in section 10(a)(4) of the FAA and
article V(2)(a) and (b) of the New York Convention.
162.
For a discussion of the circumstances under which a party may invoke
the other grounds for vacatur located in Article V(1) of the New York Convention,
see Martinez, supra note 44, at 496-506.
163.
See discussion supra at Part V.A.
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1. FAA Section 10(a)(4): Arbitrators Exceeded Their Powers;

Manifest Disregard16 4
An arbitral award may be vacated "[w]here the arbitrators
exceeded their powers." 165 This section of the FAA typically refers

to a situation where an arbitration panel decides a claim not
submitted to it. 1 66 However, many have interpreted the Wilko
Court's dictum, that arbitral awards will be reviewed for "manifest
disregard" of the law, 16 7 to be a reference to section 10(a)(4). 168 It
is only in the context of "manifest disregard" that section 10(a)(4)
could allow a court to vacate an award on grounds that an
arbitrator failed to apply a U.S. statute.
The Court did not define "manifest disregard."
Arbitral
awards are not reviewed for misapplication or misinterpretations
of the law.' 6 9 Therefore, most lower courts have interpreted
"manifest disregard" to require a showing that the arbitrator
understood and correctly stated the law, but proceeded to
disregard it. 170 In the absence of a reasoned opinion by the
arbitrator, 17 1 this has been an impossible burden for those
claiming manifest disregard.' 72 "[Considering the case 173
law ...
the manifest disregard standard may be effectively dead."

164. Whether the manifest disregard doctrine applies to awards sought to
be enforced under the New York Convention is unresolved. One case. Brandeis
Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp.. 656 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
held that the doctrine applies only to awards sought to be enforced under the
domestic FAA, not the New York Convention. However, the issue has not been
addressed by the Supreme Court, and the doctrine is still Invoked by parties
seeking vacatur under the New York Convention. For purposes of this Note, the
manifest disregard defense will be deemed available under the New York
Convention.
165.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994).
166.
For example, if the parties told the arbitrators to decide only the Issue
of fault, the arbitrators would have exceeded their powers if they also determined
a damage amount.

167.

The Court stated that the "interpretations of the law by the arbitrators

in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to Judicial
review for error in interpretation." Wilko v. Swan. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953)
(emphasis added).
168.
For an argument that the manifest disregard doctrine was an
articulation of Section 10(a)(4), see generally Galbraith, supra note 29. For the
argument that the doctrine is a separate, judicially created ground for vacatur,
see generally Randall, supra note 151.
169.
Varela, supra note 151, at 68.
170.
Galbraith, supra note 29, at 251-52.
171.
Written arbitral awards generally contain the decisions of the
arbitrators, but not their reasons. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying
text.
172. The author has been unable to locate any reported case vacating an
arbitral award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law. Indeed, courts have
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2. Article V(2)(a): Subject Matter Inarbitrable
An arbitral award may be vacated if a court finds that the
subject matter is inarbitrable under the law of the country where
enforcement is sought. 174 This provision is limited only by the
requirement that "substantially more onerous conditions" not be

placed upon the enforcement of an award than would be imposed
on a domestic award. 17 5 Thus, if the United States declares
certain statutory claims to be inarbitrable, a U.S. court may
even if the claim
refuse to enforce awards resolving such 17claims
6
transaction.
international
an
of
arose out
This would have been a viable ground for vacatur 17 7 had it
not been for the Supreme Court's determinations that claims
arising under most U.S. statutes are arbitrable when such claims
originate out of an international business transaction.
Securities, 178 antitrust,17 9 and COGSA 18 0 claims are all
arbitrable, at least when arising in international transactions.
Also, the Court has demanded that all U.S. statutes be
interpreted to allow arbitration absent some clear congressional
directive to the contrary. 18 1 Because most U.S. statutes do not
contain language clearly and explicitly prohibiting arbitration,
this ground for vacatur cannot be relied upon if an arbitrator fails
to apply U.S. statutory law.

gone to great lengths to avoid vacatur under this doctrine. For examples of
courts' unwillingness to use this doctrine, see Varela, supra note 151, at 68-71.
Jay. R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public
173.
Policy Checks on U.S. and ForeignArbitration: ArbitrationOut of Control?. 65 TUL.
L. REV. 1661, 1679 (1991).
174. NewYork Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
175. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330
U.N.T.S. at 40.
176. Martinez, supra note 44, at 506.

177. Of course, if the dispute was inarbitrable a court would not order the
parties to arbitrate. However, a court order to arbitrate is needed only when a
party refuses to comply with an arbitration agreement. Therefore, a ground for
vacatur because of inarbitrable subject matter would still be needed.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
178.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
179.
614 (1985).
180. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. 2322
(1995).
Id. at 2326.
181.
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3. Article V(2)(b): Public Policy of the Forum
A court may refuse to enforce an award because it is contrary
182
to the public policy of the country in which the court presides.
In light of the dictum in Mitsubishi that a prospective waiver of
statutory rights would be struck down on public policy
grounds,' 8 3 this has been the most frequently litigated defense
185
under the New York Convention, 1 84 but it is rarely successful.
In various contexts, public policy is equated with policies

expressed in statutes, constitutions, or judicial decisions.' 8 6 In

the context of the New York Convention, however, U.S. courts
equate public policy with the "most basic notions of morality and
justice." 187 Whether or not this test is appropriate in light of the
Mitsubishi and Sky Reefer dicta 8 8 remains a purely academic
question since this public policy test has become a standard
among the lower courts. 189
This standard has proven
insurmountable as there has been only one refusal to enforce an
award on public policy grounds. 190 That case appears to be

182.
New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42.
183.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
184.
Martinez, supra note 44, at 508.
185. Id. at 509.
186.
Sever, supra note 173, at 1664.
187.
Martinez, supra note 44, at 509 (quoting Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co.,
517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975) and Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v.
Soci~t6 Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir.
1974)).
188.
See supra notes 104 and 124 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court was clear that if the clauses operated as a prospective waiver of any
statutory rights they would violate public policy. Additionally, the Scherk Court
seemed to imply that public policy should be equated with the policies found in
statutes when it presumed, without deciding, that "the type of fraud alleged here
could be raised, under Art. VI(2)(b)] of the [New York Convention] in challenging
the enforcement of whatever arbitral award is produced through arbitration."
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974).
189.
Martinez, supranote 44, at 510.
190. Sama, supra note 38, at 81. That case Is Laminoirs-TrefileriesCabelieries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Col, 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
Sama summarized that case as follows:
In this case, an ICC award specified two different interest rates depending
upon the dates of the invoices in question. The court applied a French law
provision that said that, if the award wasn't satisfied within two months of
its issuance, there would be an immediate escalation of all applicable
interest rates. The court found the higher interest rate to be penal in
nature in light of the interest rates available under a Georgia statute,
notwithstanding a Georgia statute under which parties in large
commercial disputes could agree in writing to whatever interest rate they
wanted.
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unique since "there have been no cases in which enforcement...
has been denied when there have been reasonable and fair
procedures applied in the arbitration."' 9 1

C. PartiesMay Opt Out of Regulatory Statutes
The Court's decisions to allow arbitration of statutory claims
arising from international business transactions were based on
comity. 19 2 In its reliance on comity, the Court made two implied
assumptions: (1) that in ratifying the New York Convention,
Congress determined that the goal of international business
harmony overrides any other U.S. policies; and (2) that other
signatories to the New York Convention would retaliate against
the United States if it did not allow arbitration of its statutory
claims. Neither of these assumptions are warranted.
1. Congress Did Not Intend the Goal of International Business
Harmony to Override All Other U.S. Policies
The Court placed great emphasis upon private parties'
freedom of contract, allowing parties to international business
contracts to choose the forum to resolve disputes. In reaching
this determination, the Court assumed a congressional policy of
promoting international commerce solely because of the accession
It equated the New York
to the New York Convention.
Convention's uniformity in enforcement of arbitral awards with
consistency in interpretation of the grounds for vacatur, an
interpretation at odds with congressional equation of uniformity
with exclusivity of those grounds. 19 3 In fact, Congress' hesitation
in acceding to the New York Convention was only diminished after
it was informed of the inarbitrability provision of Article II(I).
There is no evidence, therefore, that Congress intended to
promote international commerce or arbitration of statutory

claims.
Indeed, "Ia]s the state's responsibility for the economy has
grown in this century, so, too, has the need to throw a wide net

Sama, supra,at 81.

191.

Sama.supra note 38, at 81.

192.

For purposes of this discussion, comity includes the notion of

protecting private expectations, promoting predictability in international business
transactions, and effectuating other international business concerns articulated
by the Court in its decisions discussed supra Part IV.See Joel R. Paul, Comity in
International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 44 (1991) ("ITihe rhetoric of comity
[includes] balancing state interests, protecting private expectations in
International commerce, and avoiding interference with the condtict of foreign
relations. ...
193. See supra Part III.C.
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over extraterritorial activities that have a direct and substantial
impact on its economy." 194
Regulatory schemes are rarely
designed to protect the parties involved per se, but rather to

control in various ways the economic system for the good of all
citizens. 19 5 In this regard, economic regulatory statutes are a
matter of business impositions in exchange for guiding the overall
economic climate in the United States. 196 These impositions are,

of course, made upon businesses engaged in international
commerce. Any type of commerce involving a U.S. party will have
a potential impact upon the U.S. economy, so the international
factor does not make the congressional determinations any less
97
relevant. 1
The business world, the courts, and foreign governments do
not decide such broad economic policy-the U.S. Congress does.
Indeed, much of the regulation imposes significant costs upon
businesses, costs which the business world would prefer to avoid.
To allow parties the freedom to contract around or out of these
regulatory schemes would be counter to the congressional
determinations that certain business interests should be
subordinated to the public interests in the economy. 198 Without
more evidence of an intent to promote international commerce
than an accession to an arbitration treaty, the courts should not
have encroached upon legislative territory, but should have
enforced the policies set by the legislature.

194.
Paul, supra note 192, at 60. "This need is particularly clear in the
areas of competition policy and securities regulation." Id.
195.
Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An
Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481, 503 (1981); see
also William W. Park, Illusion and Reallty In InternationalForum Selection, 30 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 135, 176 (1995) ("[L]egislation that promotes a fair stock market or free
competition creates direct benefits not only for the contracting parties, but also
for the community at large.").
196.
For example, the function of the antitrust laws is to "preserve
competition and ensure the proper operation of the free enterprise system." Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), in HAROLD G. MAIER, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR AN ADVANCED

COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 173, 177 (Vanderbilt University School of Law Class
Pak, 1994) [hereinafter MAIER, Amicus Brief].
197.
For example, in its brief as amicus curiae, the government noted that
the policy considerations embodied in the antitrust laws "lose no pertinence or
weight in an international context." MAIER, Amicus Brief, supra note 196, at 182
(quoting Petitioner's brief, app. A20); see also Paul, supra note 192, at 66
("Promoting international business becomes a rationale for exempting conduct
that may distort the domestic market .
").
198.
See Paul, supra note 192, at 7 ("[Clomity preserves privateparty [sic]
autonomy to opt out of a particular system of domestic regulation. In this sense,
comity expands the scope of private transactions as it restricts the scope of public
regulation.").
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2. Comity is not Applied by Other Nations
The Court assumed that interpreting domestic statutes in a
manner which would violate the pro-enforcement spirit of the New
York Convention could compromise the U.S. role in multilateral
endeavors. 199 This assumption was based on the U.S. view of
comity as some sort of obligation, but more than "mere courtesy
and good will." 20 0 Even if all other signatories allowed arbitration
of their statutory claims, no evidence suggests that other
countries would retaliate if the New York Convention were
interpreted as allowing the United States to declare claims arising
under its regulatory statutes inarbitrable.
Customary international law does not require a country, in
the name of comity, to defer to a foreign sovereign 20 ' when foreign
law would conflict with the forum's public policy or rights of its
citizens. 20 2 In fact, the courts of most other countries generally do
not apply notions of comity, 203 and many attempt to expand their
jurisdiction by applying an "effects principle. '20 4 The English
commentators believe that the application of comity is an abuse of
judicial discretion. 20 5 The United States appears to be the only
country that weighs competing foreign and domestic interests in
the name of comity. 2 0 6 Even if other countries applied some
notion of comity, they are on notice that other signatories to the
New York Convention may consider certain issues nonarbitrable.
As the government argued in Mitsubishi:
(Blecause the many nations that have adopted the Convention

have done so in the knowledge that there are certain issues other
contracting states may consider nonarbitrable, the United States'
insistence on the nonarbitrability of [statutory] claims seems
unlikely to result in either surprise or recrimination on the part of

other parties to the Convention.

2 07

199. Vemar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. 2322,
2329 (1995).
200. Paul, supra note 192, at 11.
201. Id. at7.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id. at 44. "Although exceptional cases do discuss comity, such cases
typically involve questions of sovereignty or public international law." Id.
204. Id. at 32. The "effects principle" Is the principle that a country's law
will be applied when there is a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on that
country's trade and commerce. Id.
205. Id. at 41.
206. Id. at 44. "At best, it is only incidental that some civil-law systems
arrive at results comparable to the decisions of U.S. courts." Id. at 35.
207. MAIER, Amicus Brief, supra note 196, at 183.
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The New York Convention itself allows a country to declare
certain subject matters to be inarbitrable. 20 8 Signatories to the
New York Convention, therefore, should not be surprised when
other signatories deem particular subject matters inarbitrable.
Certainly a determination of inarbitrability should not give rise to
retaliation on the part of other signatories. In any event, courts of
other countries do not give weight to foreign interests in their
determinations, but focus solely on the public policies of their
own nations. 2 09 Therefore, the Supreme Court was wrong to voice
comity concerns without an explicit congressional directive.
D. Arbitral Tribunals are not AppropriateForafor Interpretationof
U.S. PublicPolicy
There are two main functions of a judiciary: (1) to provide
clarity and certainty in the law through rendering decisions in
specific controversies; and (2) to guard and enforce the public
policies embodied in the statutory law.
Arbitrators are illequipped to assume these functions even though statutory claims
are still submitted to them. The determination of statutory claims
in a forum that is not competent to perform these functions
imposes serious consequences upon society.
One consequence of judicial determination of cases is that
the law evolves with each individual dispute resolution. With a

determination of a statute's meaning and application in each
case, that particular statute becomes clearer and more precise. It
is apparent that as a substantial body of precedent develops, the
statute will become more defined and specific. In turn, parties
subject to the particular law can plan their actions with greater
certainty and predictability.
By encouraging arbitration of
statutory claims, courts are denied this opportunity to develop a
2 10
body of precedent.

208.
209.
210.

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Paul, supra note 192, at 35.
Professor Fiss noted:

In our political system, courts are reactive institutions. They do not
search out interpretive occasions, but instead wait for others to bring
matters to their attention. They also rely for the most part on others to
investigate and present the law and facts. A settlement will thereby
deprive a court of the occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an
interpretation.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement. 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). Although
discussing settlements, Professor Fiss' reasoning is Just as applicable to
arbitrations. A relevant example is when the Sky Reefer Court was deprived of
the opportunity to decide whether the duties under COGSA are delegable or
nondelegable. See supra notes 122 and 124 and accompanying text.
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Because transcripts of arbitral proceedings and reasoned
opinions generally are not available, 2 1 ' arbitration does not
provide a substitute body of precedent. The law may cease to
develop if resolutions of disputes about new problems are no
longer being made public. 2 12 Without precedent interpreting
statutes, parties cannot confidently plan their actions in
accordance with a given statute. One function of a judiciary,
therefore, is not fulfilled by arbitrations of statutory claims.
Another function of the judiciary is to guard and enforce the
values embodied in the regulatory statutes. Although often
experts in the subject matter of a dispute, 2 13 arbitrators are not
experts in any particular nation's statutory law. 2 14 Indeed,
arbitrators are expected to be unattached to any national
regulatory authority. 2 15

Therefore,

arbitrators

may not be

sufficiently familiar with U.S. statutory law to understand its
intricate public policies, nor in a position to guard and enforce
those policies.
In litigation, certain types of actions can be settled only with
judicial approval because of the effects the settlement may have
on parties who did not necessarily participate in settlement
negotiations, but who have a stake in the outcome. 2 16 As
Professor Fiss observed, this task is not fulfilled outside of the
litigation context:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in
which the public participates. These officials, like members of the
legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been
defined and conferred by public law, not by private agreement.
Their job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord

211. See supraPart V.A.
212. See William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice:
Safeguarding ProceduralIntegrity In InternationalArbitration, 63 TUL. L. REv. 647,
674 (1989) (suggesting that the "evaluation of a country's substantive law" would
stagnate if courts are not presented with disputes about new problems).
213.
Galbraith, supra note 29, at 244.
214.
See Von Mehren, supranote 13, at 609.
215.
BORN, supra note 141, at 6. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has
noted that an advantage of arbitration is neutrality and that arbitrators are not
beholden to any nation's laws. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985).
216.
One such example is class actions. Rule 23(e) of the U.S. Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires judicial approval of a settlement. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e). Also, "Itihe [Tunney] Act establishes procedures for giving outsiders notice
of a proposed settlement in a government antitrust suit and requires the judge to
decide whether a settlement proposed by the Department of Justice is in 'the
public interest.'" Fiss, supra note 210, at 1081.
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with them. This duty is not discharged when parties settle [or
2 17
arbitrate].

Since the focus of arbitration is solely on the parties involved and
does not necessarily take into account any policies which may be
embodied in a particular country's statutes, its effects on society
and other third parties, as well as the public policies incorporated
in a nation's statutes, go unnoticed. 2 18 As Professor Fiss aptly
noted, "The settlement of a school suit might secure the peace,
2 19

but not racial equality."

With regard to statutory law, arbitrators are ill-equipped to
assume the functions of a judiciary. Regulated parties require a
developed body of precedent on applicable statutes to effectively
plan their actions in conformity therewith. In addition, statutes
contain policies which are designed to protect the public, and the
judiciary interprets and enforces these policies to ensure the
Since neither of these
attainment of congressional goals.
functions can be performed through arbitration as it currently
exists, private parties attain the benefit of individual peace at the
expense of the U.S. public. Before irreparable damage is inflicted
upon the U.S. public and its regulatory scheme, Congress should

amend the FAA to forbid arbitration of any claims arising under a
U.S. regulatory statute and prevent the enforcement of any award
rendered upon such claim.

VI. CONCLUSION

Arbitration developed as an alternative method of resolving
issues of contract interpretation or common law disputes. In the
United States, the courts were originally reluctant to enforce predispute arbitration agreements, but enforced only arbitratation
agreements which were made after the dispute arose. State
legislatures eventually passed arbitration acts which mandated
enforcement of pre-dispute agreements. Congress passed the FAA
to bring the federal courts' policy regarding these agreements in
line with the states. In addition, Congress later overcame its
skepticism and ratified the New York Convention with the

217. Fiss, supra note 210, at 1085. Although Professor Fiss was discussing
a deficiency of settlement, his observation is applicable to arbitration as well.
Both forms of dispute resolution focus on the private interests of the parties
involved with no consideration of outside interests or effects.
218. In this regard, see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If there are victims here, they are not AlbertoCulver the corporation, but the thousands of investors who are the security
holders in Alberto-Culver.").
219. Fiss, supranote 210, at 1085.
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assumption that a country could declare certain subject matters
inarbitrable under its provisions. No evidence exists which shows
Congress intended to alter this status quo by allowing the
arbitration of statutory claims.
The Supreme Court, through a series of cases, interpreted
congressional intentions, in enacting the FAA and ratifying the
New York Convention, in a contrary manner. It focused on a
vague notion of comity, including the promotion of international
commerce in world markets. It noted the special role forum
selection clauses have in obtaining vital certainty and stability in
international commercial contracts. It warned against forcing
U.S. laws on the world and the dangers that such action would
pose to U.S. multilateral endeavors. To the Court, these factors
imputed a congressional intention to allow arbitration of statutory
claims, at least where Congress did not clearly declare a subject
matter inarbitrable. However, the Court was not justified in
relying upon these factors for two reasons. First, the ratification
of the New York Convention is not sufficient evidence that

Congress intended to promote international commerce. Second,
other nations do not utilize the same notion of comity applied by
the U.S. courts. The United States seems to be the only nation
that will subordinate its domestic policies to other countries'
domestic law based on some sense of obligation. The Court did
not necessarily approve of arbitrators failing to apply U.S.
regulatory statutes. However, the Court's decision to interpret all
statutory claims as arbitrable in the absence of a clear
congressional declaration to the contrary will have the same effect
because of the current structure of arbitration.
The Court believed and emphasized that an opportunity for a
judicial second look existed at the award-enforcement stage. The
only three grounds for vacatur because of an arbitrator's failure to
apply U.S. regulatory statutes, however, are rarely successful.
First, in the wake of the Supreme Court's mandate that all
statutes be interpreted as allowing arbitration, lower courts have
strictly interpreted the grounds for vacatur and have devised
demanding burdens which are virtually impossible for a party
seeking vacatur to overcome. 220 In addition to these stringent
standards imposed by the lower courts, parties seeking vacatur
face an even more insurmountable obstacle-obtaining tangible
evidence of the arbitrator's reasoning. Given that arbitral awards
generally consist merely of the decision without expounding upon
the reasoning behind it, as transcripts of hearings are rarely
taken, arbitrators have no further involvement with the case after
the award is rendered, and evidence to prove some sort of

220.

See supra Part V.B.
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manifest disregard of the law is usually not available. Therefore,
a regulated party is essentially free to avoid application of
regulatory statutes by inserting an arbitration clause into its
contracts. The harmed party then has no recourse.
Injustice between the parties to the arbitration is not the only
pitfall to arbitrating claims arising under regulatory statutes.
Society is also harmed because it cannot plan its actions with the
degree of certainty it could obtain if a body of precedent was
developed by the judiciary. Further, the, goals and policies of
Congress in regulating certain parties are not given effect.
Therefore, private peace is secured at the expense of the public
good.
The Court originally expressed a mere preference for
arbitration, finding neither the FAA nor the New York Convention
absolutely controlling. That preference has evolved into an

unequivocal mandate which the Court has no intention of
revoking. The FAA and the New York Convention have become
dangerous tools in the Court's pursuit of international harmony.
Before irreparable damage is done to U.S. regulatory schemes,
Congress should amend the FAA to provide that any claim arising
under a U.S. regulatory statute is inarbitrable and that any award
rendered upon such a claim is unenforceable.
ChristineL. Davitz

